Analysis of California Proposition 62

Marc LeBlanc, 10/25/2004
(10/26: Some typos fixed, executive summary added, a couple points reinforced.)
(Later that same day: Summary beefed up)

Executive Summary

The Proposition

Proposition 62 will change the rules of elections for state offices. It will guarantee that at most two candidates will appear on the general election ballot. Those two candidates will be selected in a single, non-partisan, "open primary" election. Only the top two vote-getters in that primary will appear on the general election ballot.

See the official text and analysis of the proposition.

Goals of Proposition 62

Proposition 62 appears aimed at two goals:

Conclusion

Proposition 62 is not real reform. As a solution to the spoiler effect, it is at best a stopgap that will backfire in the long term. It does not deter primary voters intent on sabotaging the opposition, but instead it "raises the stakes" of such a strategy.

Vote No.

Introduction

Making a decision with a large group is a difficult and unwieldy problem. An election is a process that attempts to solve that problem. Elections strive to produce a result that is both popular and wise, and to do so in as efficient a manner as possible. Elections are governed by rules, they require the willful participation of voters, and they produce an unambiguous winner. In that light, it becomes clear why elections are so often described as games. It also becomes clear that the rules of an election are very important, and can have a profound impact on the strategies employed and the results produced.

In informal discussions, we often equate "elections" and "voting" with democracy. But we must remember that these are separate concepts. Democracy is an ideal: rule by the people. It is not wedded to any particular method or process. An election is a process, a practical attempt to achieve democracy. So, without contradicting ourselves, we can say that some elections are more democratic than others, and that the rules of an election should strive to make it as democratic as possible.

In a few short days, Californians will be voting on Proposition 62. This proposition will change the rules of elections for state offices. It will guarantee that at most two candidates will appear on the general election ballot. Those two candidates will be selected by a single "open primary" election. This "open primary" will use a ballot consisting of all potential candidates, and the top two vote-getters in that primary will appear on the general election ballot, regardless of their party affiliation.

Understanding the implications of any ballot initiative is a daunting task, one that can only be accomplished by degrees. To understand the impact that Proposition 62 will have on the electoral process, we cannot analyze its effect on primaries and general elections separately. We must look at the whole of the process. Will Proposition 62 empower voters to make the wisest decision? Will it instill voters with confidence in the system? Will it change the strategies that candidates and factions employ? In order to answer these questions, and to understand the motivation behind the proposition, we need to examine two political phenomena that have come into the spotlight in recent years. I call these phenomena the Spoiler Effect and the Open-Primary Conundrum.

The Spoiler effect

The Spoiler Effect is the phenomenon in which a minor candidate "steals votes" from a more popular candidate, causing the second candidate to lose the election. Here the minor candidate is called the "spoiler" candidate. All "spoiler" candidates have two properties in common: (1) They cannot win the election, and (2) By themselves, they have the power to choose the winner of the election, by choosing whether or not to stay in the race or drop out. The spoiler effect hurts democracy; it can cause elections to produce a result against the interests of the voters, and it puts undue power over the election into the hands of the spoiler candidate.

Today, the notion that Ralph Nader was a spoiler in the 2000 presidential election is considered a piece of conventional wisdom. In 2004, both major parties have maneuvered to control whether Nader will appear on the ballot in swing states, and this can be taken as evidence that this "conventional wisdom" is believed on both sides of the aisle. To really know whether Nader was a spoiler in 2000, we need to know how Nader voters would have behaved had Nader not appeared on their ballots. How many would have voted for Gore? For Bush? For some other candidate? For no one? The answers to these questions cannot be found on the ballots themselves; other methods such as polling must be employed, and those methods are imperfect.

The Ralph Nader example illustrates another important point: the spoiler effect doesn't need to actually happen in order for it to change the behavior of candidates, parties and voters. Whether or not Nader was a spoiler in 2000, the fear of him becoming a spoiler in 2004 has had a grave impact on the strategies of the two parties.

The Open-Primary Conundrum

The Open-Primary Conundrum can be described as follows: A political party wants to nominate the most electable candidate. But to do that, it needs to take into account the opinions and needs of all voters—including its potential opponents—and not just its own party membership. However, if a party were to go out and ask non-members for their opinions on this matter, potential opponents have every strategic incentive to lie. To put it bluntly: if voting in an opposing party's primary costs nothing, why not walk in and vote for their least electable candidate, in order to sabotage their chances? The question for a political party is: how to best capture the opinions of all voters in a way that is not vulnerable to "strategic deception."

In 1996, California responded to this issue by adopting Proposition 198. This proposition institutes a "blanket primary" for state offices. In effect, every party's primary is held at the same time, and every voter may choose one party's primary to vote in, and may choose a different party for each office. Thus, attempts to "strategically sabotage" an opponents primary come at the cost of voting in one's own primary. This may or may not be too high a price, depending on how hotly contested one's own primary is. The blanket primary helps independent voters the most, by allowing them to choose the primary that most concerns them for each office.

The Implications of Proposition 62

Proposition 62 will put in place what is effectively a "two round runoff" election process, where the first round is the "primary" and the second round is the "general election." Many districts throughout the country use runoff elections in the case where the general election does not produce a decisive winner, but Proposition 62 would cause the runoff election to effectively always happen. Governments already using this system include the state government of Louisiana and the national government of France. In both places, the system has caused controversies.

Proposition 62 mandates that only the top two vote-getting candidates be placed on the general election ballot. It is illuminating to ask: Where did the number "two" come from? Why not three candidates? Why not one? The answer should be clear: A one-candidate general election is little more than a ceremony; all the decision-making would have already happened in the primary. On the other hand, a three-candidate election would admit the possibility of "spoilers." In that light, Proposition 62 should be seen as a compromise between those extremes. It takes some amount of wind out of the spoiler effect, while at the same time putting more of the decision-making burden on the primary.

It is my opinion that Proposition 62 speaks primarily to the Spoiler Effect, and its effect on the Open-Primary Conundrum will be negligible at best, and negative at worst. Without speculating as to the Proposition's authors' intent, I would say that its use of the language of the open-primary debate is somewhat misleading.

Implications for the Spoiler Effect

At first glance, it would appear that Proposition 62 eliminates spoilers entirely. It does not. It will eliminate some spoilers, provided that they are too weak to win a spot on the general election ballot. But there is another kind of spoiler, one strong enough to "displace" a more electable candidate from the general election ballot, but not strong enough to win the general election once she gets there. Essentially, the "spoiling" happens in the primary rather than in the general election. For detailed numerical examples of the spoiler effect, see Appendix A.

Had Proposition 62 been in place for the 2000 presidential election, it would have prevented Nader from becoming a spoiler in that case, but it would not have prevented Nader from licking his wounds, working to gain popularity, and coming back to become a spoiler in some future year. In fact, under Proposition 62, Nader would attract some primary voters who mistakenly believe that it is "safe" to vote for him. If he attracts enough of these, he becomes a spoiler immediately.

In terms of its implications for the spoiler effect, Proposition 62 is at best a short-term, stopgap measure. It can still fail, and when it does, it will fail far more catastrophically. In some circumstances, it can place voters in a paradoxical and untenable position, where going to the polls and voting will actually hurt their interests relative to staying home and not voting at all.

Implications for the Open-Primary Conundrum

Compared to the existing blanket primary system, Proposition 62 does not change the rules concerning the contents of the ballot, or the choices available to the voters. It only changes the way those choices are interpreted. Instead of guaranteeing each party a place on the general election ballot, Proposition 62 only gives spots to the top two vote-getters.

In general, Proposition 62 raises the cost of using your primary vote to sabotage another party. Your party's candidate is no longer guaranteed a spot on the ballot; he needs your primary vote. Using your primary vote on a "sabotage" candidate runs the risk that your own candidate will not make the cut.

However, Proposition 62 also vastly increases the benefits of pursuing a destructive voting strategy. A large political faction may be able to devote some of its voters to creating a spoiler candidate, thus pitting their own candidate against a weak opponent in the general election. Instead of sabotaging a single party, this strategy effectively sabotages all parties simultaneously, causing the general election to be determined by the primary.

In terms of its ability to put the most electable candidates on the ballot, Proposition 62 is of questionable value. In my opinion, in any given election it will either succeed mildly or fail catastrophically.

Implications for Political Behavior

A few words need to be said about how the Proposition will change the behavior of political parties and candidates. The rules of the electoral process have effects that reach far beyond the events of election day. They can affect what candidates choose to run, what platforms they adopt and what strategies they employ.

Under Proposition 62, political parties will have a strong incentive to field only one candidate in the primary. A political party that fields two or more candidates runs the risk of one candidate acting as a spoiler for the other. This is an important point, because it means that the spoiler effect doesn't need to actually happen for it to have an effect on the political process. In order to narrow the field of candidates before the primary, I suspect that political parties will adopt some sort of "pre-primary" process, effectively moving the partisan primaries earlier.

In our current electoral process, each voter records exactly one piece of information on her ballot: which single candidate is her favorite? A voter is not given the opportunity to express a preference beyond that; no distinction can be made between her second favorite candidate and her least favorite. Thus, the system places a high premium on being a voter's favorite candidate. The candidate that is hated by 49% of the electorate and loved by 51% will defeat the candidate that is liked by everyone. As a consequence, candidates from major parties tend to steer clear of the political center. Candidates that are "politically well-defined," even to the point of extremism, fare better than centrists or "compromise" candidates.

This kind of strategic thinking doesn't necessarily extend to minor parties. These parties often have no chance of winning the election, and therefore need to focus on more long-term goals: spreading their message, making a good showing, and gaining political momentum over the course of many elections. Thus, it behooves minor parties to cultivate a broad appeal, and shy away from "over-defining themselves" politically.

Proposition 62 gives minor parties a new short-term goal to shoot for: earning one of two coveted spots on the general election ballot. Even if they have no chance of winning the general election, making the ballot will be a huge boost to a minor party's exposure and their image of legitimacy. In pursuit of this goal, I expect that Proposition 62 will cause minor parties to flee the center, and adopt the love-us-or-hate-us strategies currently employed by the major parties.

Conclusion

Pros

Proposition 62 will:

Cons

Proposition 62 will:

In Brief

Proposition 62 is not real reform. As a solution to the spoiler effect, it is at best a stopgap that will backfire in the long term. It does not deter primary voters intent on sabotaging the opposition, but instead it "raises the stakes" of such a strategy.

Vote No.

Appendix A: Examples of the Spoiler Effect

Let's consider an election with three candidates: Shrub, Impale, and Perigee. Let's also suppose that the electorate breaks down into four demographic groups:

Group A: Loves Shrub, tolerates Impale, hates Perigee
Group B: Loves Impale, tolerates Shrub, hates Perigee
Group C: Loves Impale, likes Perigee, hates Shrub
Group D: Loves Perigee, likes Impale, hates Shrub

The relative size of these demographic groups will determine the results of the election.

The Weak Spoiler Case

Suppose the voter demographics break down like this:

Group A (Shrub, Impale): 45%
Group B (Impale, Shrub): 6%
Group C (Impale, Perigee): 38%
Group D (Perigee, Impale): 11%

At the polls, the results will be:

Shrub: 45%
Impale: 44%
Perigee: 11%

With Shrub winning the election, but not with a majority.

We can plainly see that Perigee is the spoiler here. If he leaves the race, his votes go to Impale, making him the winner:

Shrub: 45%
Impale: 55%

California Proposition 62 handles this case fine, by removing Perigee from the general election ballot.

The Strong Spoiler Case

Now lets consider what happens when Perigee gains in popularity. Since the voters in groups A and B already hate Perigee, he's unlikely to change any of their minds. So it's reasonable to assume that all of his new converts will come from group C. If Perigee gets enough voters to move from group C to group D, then maybe he can get group D to outnumber group C:

Group A (Shrub, Impale): 45%
Group B (Impale, Shrub): 6%
Group C (Impale, Perigee): 21%
Group D (Perigee, Impale): 28%

In this case, it might be hard to decide which candidate ought to win the election. To shed some light on that question, let's consider every possible general election that Proposition 62 could produce:

Shrub vs. Impale: Impale wins with 55%
Shrub vs. Perigee: Shrub wins with 51%
Impale vs. Perigee: Impale wins with 72%

Of the three candidates, Impale is the only one who is guaranteed to win if he makes the general election. He is more popular than either of the other two candidates, taken individually. If somehow he fails to make the general election, he could challenge the winner to a one-on-one rematch and defeat him. So, it's reasonable to say that Impale is still the most popular candidate overall, and the appropriate candidate to win the general election. (In election theory circles, Impale would be called the Condorcet Winner.)

However, under proposition 62, Impale loses the primary, and is kept off the general election ballot:

Shrub: 45%
Impale: 27%
Perigee: 28%

Perigee has once again become a spoiler. He can't win the general election because 51% of the population hates him. But he can choose which of Shrub and Impale gets elected by choosing whether to say in or drop out of the race.

Group B is the lynchpin of this phenomenon, and the key to understanding why it happens. The presence of Group B demonstrates that Impale and Perigee are not political clones of each other; Impale is closer to the political center, and has some supporters who would prefer to jump to Shrub than support Perigee's brand of extremism.

The Tipping Point

Now let's look at the cusp between these two cases, from which we can make some important observations:

Group A (Shrub, Impale): 45%
Group B (Impale, Shrub): 6%
Group C (Impale, Perigee): 21.5% + 1 vote
Group D (Perigee, Impale): 27.5%
(Pedants who want to claim that this no longer adds up to 100% should feel free to read Group A's number as "45% - 1 vote")

If we consider every possible general election, we see that Impale is still the overall winner.

In the three-way election, Perigee would be eliminated by the narrowest of margins, and Impale would win the general election:

Shrub: 45%
Impale: 27.5% + 1 vote
Perigee: 27.5%

Now let's imagine that two new voters (from the same demographic group) come to the primary to vote.

If these two voters are in Group D, they will vote for Perigee. Impale will be eliminated, and Shrub will win the general election. Thus, by coming and voting, these two voters have hurt their interests. Their vote changed the winner from Impale to Shrub, even though they prefer Impale over Shrub. These two voters would have been better off staying home and not voting! Our current system, however flawed, cannot fail that spectacularly.

If the two new voters support Shrub, then their best way to vote is to strategically vote for Perigee. Voting for Shrub will have no effect, but voting for Perigee will turn him into a spoiler, and cause their favorite candidate to win the general election.

So here we see how the runoff system of Proposition 62 can not only elect the wrong candidate, but also encourage deceptive voting strategies, and create paradoxical situations where voters can vote against their own interests.